Abstract-This paper proposes an iterative bidding framework for integrated due-date management (DDM) decision making. We focus on a type of make-to-order environment in which a firm needs to quote due dates and prices and to schedule the production of a variety of job orders required by a large group of customers. In most cases, customers prefer shorter due dates. However, given limited production capacity and various cost constraints, the firm has to balance the attractiveness of its due-date quotations and the reliability of delivering accepted job orders. The key issue is how to integrate DDM decisions such that high-quality solutions, which benefit both the firm and the customers, can be obtained. We study the integrated DDM in an economic setting where customers are modeled as self-interested agents and the objective of the firm is to maximize social welfare. We present an iterative bidding framework as a decentralized decision support tool which enables the integration of key DDM decisions. Effective solutions are achieved through the automated negotiation between the firm and its customers. We provide analytical results on the application of the proposed framework to two special cases of the integrated DDM. We also evaluate the performance of the framework on general DDM problems through a computational study.
I. INTRODUCTION

I
N SUPPLY chain management, the due date of an order is the promised date that the supplier will deliver the product(s). The task of due-date management (DDM) is to determine, in a timely manner, if and when an order can be fulfilled profitably. As in other management processes, DDM involves different types of decisions: pricing, order acceptance (or demand management), due-date setting, and scheduling [1] . These decisions are interrelated. In general, demand can be modeled as a function of market price and delivery time. Customer demand usually increases with shorter delivery times as well as with lower prices [2] , [3] . In the case of make-toorder manufacturing, before a firm accepts an order, it evaluates the profitability of that order and negotiates with the customer on the terms of the transactions, particularly on the price and the due date. If the price or the due date quoted by the firm is unsatisfactory, the customer may choose not to place the order. Conversely, if the price that the customer is willing to pay is too low or the due date requested is too short to make it a profitable transaction for the firm, the firm might decide not to accept the order. As the DDM decisions are tightly coupled, it is desirable to model the interrelations among them and consider them simultaneously. However, given the complexities of these decisions, in practice, they are often made sequentially. The way that a firm makes DDM decisions is reflected by the timebased competition strategy that it adopts.
There are three time-based competition strategies used by firms: 1) quick service with minimal wait; 2) "uniform" short lead time 1 guarantee; and 3) due-date quotation [3] . The first strategy does not involve order acceptance and due-date quotation decisions. The focus here is to schedule job orders such that they can be served as fast as possible. The second strategy promises a uniform lead time guarantee to all customers. Although a firm can influence the demand rate by adjusting the length of the guaranteed lead time, there is no direct integration between the decisions of order acceptance and scheduling. In fact, under this strategy, there is a risk that the demand may exceed the firms' capacity to respond. Uniform lead time guarantee is widely adopted in the service and make-to-order manufacturing sectors [3] , [4] . While this strategy may be easy to implement and effective in terms of attracting more customers, it has certain negative impacts. As shown in [1] , since the lead times are set without considering the characteristics of the order and the current status of production, they may be unrealistic in terms of production scheduling. Consequently, lead time performance may worsen, leading to disappointed customers and/or inflicting higher costs due to expediting. On the other hand, the lead times will be overstated when the demand is low, and some customers may choose to go elsewhere. Furthermore, additional capacity may be needed to maintain the reliability of on-time delivery. The added capacity increases total production costs and affects the price of the products. Industry practice suggests that customers may be willing to pay a price premium for shorter delivery times [5] . However, in the cases where the premium cannot compensate the cost of expediting, accepting short-lead-time orders becomes unprofitable. The third strategy encourages potential customers to get a due-date "quote" prior to ordering. As the quoted due dates can be calculated based on the schedule of already accepted orders, this strategy has the potential of integrating due-date quotation and scheduling decisions. In addition, by quoting prices and due dates, the firm makes an order selection/acceptance decision by influencing which orders finally end up in the system. This strategy is more aggressive than the first one because a "quoted" lead time is considered as an irrevocable offer and, once accepted by the customer, the firm needs to deliver as promised. Otherwise, delay penalties may occur. Given the limited capacities of a firm, the due-date quotation strategy has the potential of effectively coordinating the DDM decisions and achieving optimal solutions in terms of resource utilization and profitability. However, this strategy is difficult to implement: More decisions need to be considered concurrently. If counteroffers from customers are allowed, the implementation of this strategy also requires a multilateral negotiation mechanism between the firm and its customers.
The purpose of this research is to develop an iterative bidding-based multilateral negotiation framework to support the integration of DDM decisions under the due-date quotation strategy. Unlike some online dynamic bidding systems [6] , [7] , we focus on an offline setting in which all the information about the problem, such as job arrival and processing times, is available at the beginning of the scheduling horizon. In this setting, the resource requirements of multiple job orders need to be considered concurrently during the decision making process. Our main contribution is the design of the multilateral negotiation framework for DDM. The framework is implemented by an iterative bidding procedure. It incorporates all key DDM decisions. It also provides DDM process automation, which allows the firm and its customers to construct efficient production schedules through automated multilateral negotiation. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II describes and formulates the integrated DDM problem. Section III presents the structure and components of the proposed iterative bidding framework. Section IV provides theoretical analysis on the properties of the framework and evaluates its performance through a computational study. Section V compares the proposed framework with existing DDM approaches. Section VI concludes this paper and discusses future improvements of the framework.
II. INTEGRATED DDM PROBLEM
Integrated DDM is a decentralized multilateral decision making process. From the perspective of the firm, it combines pricing, order selection, due-date setting, and scheduling decisions. The decision facing the customer is whether to place an order given the price and due date offered by the firm or how to assign new prices to the due dates in a counteroffer to maximize customer benefit. We assume that the firm has limited manufacturing capacity to process job orders from customers and that the objective of the firm is to maximize market efficiency, which is the sum of the values on a solution across all customers, rather than its revenue. 2 Each customer has one job order to be processed by the firm. An order has a release time, a preferred due date, and a deadline. The customer's value of an order (i.e., the price that she is willing to pay) declines with increasing delay of the delivery date. The customers' value functions are their private information. The integrated DDM problem involves the selection of customer orders and allocation of the manufacturing resources of the firm to the orders such that the deadline requirements of all selected orders are met and the sum of customers' values is maximized.
As an example, we present a typical integrated DDM problem based on a case study from [9] . 3 As shown in Fig. 1 , a firm manufactures windows and doors for home builders as well as individual home owners. Based on the customer requirements, the orders are customized, which may include different product types, sizes, and quantities as well as preferred due dates and deadlines. In this setting, the integrated DDM problem facing the firm is to coordinate the decisions regarding which order to accept, at what price, and with what delivery date. For customers, they need to decide how to adjust their orders in terms of requested due dates and prices if their original orders are turned down. We consider the offline DDM problems in which the firm needs to coordinate its DDM decisions across a larger group of customers for a specific production time window (e.g., a week or a month) and the information about customers' job orders are available at the beginning of the decision making process.
A. Centralized Formulation
As previously mentioned, we consider integrated DDM as a decentralized decision making problem in the sense that the actual customer valuation of due dates is private information, which is not known to the firm. However, to clearly demonstrate the combinatorial optimization nature of the problem, we first assume a centralized environment, i.e., customers' valuations are known to the firm. With this assumption, we can conveniently model the problem as a mixed integer program. The decentralized characteristic of the problem will be considered when we develop the game theoretic modeling and iterative bidding framework.
Consider a type of DDM problem which consists of a set of n customers and a firm. Each customer j(j = 1, . . . , n) has a job to be processed by the firm. A job requires the processing of a sequence of operations o j,k (k = 1, . . . , n j ). An operation o j,k (j = 1, . . . , n, k = 1, . . . , n j ) has a specified processing time t j,k ∈ R + , and its execution requires the exclusive use of a designated resource for the duration of its processing. There are precedence constraints among operations of a job; that is, o j,k must precede o j,k+1 . q j,k,j ,k = 1, if o j,k and o j ,k need to be processed on the same resource; otherwise, q j,k,j ,k = 0. A job j has a release time r j and a hard deadline d j . r j is the earliest time that j can be available for processing. d j is the latest completion time of j in a schedule. For a schedule S which contains an allocation of the firm's production resources to customer orders, a customer will have a valuation of S. In this paper, we follow the private value model introduced by Vickrey [10] . Therefore, a customer has a value for each feasible schedule, and these values do not depend on the private information of the other customers. Each customer knows her own values but not the values of others. A customer will not accept any schedule S if its job will be completed after the job's hard deadline d j or before its release time r j . In these cases, the customer's valuation of S is zero, and in terms of DDM, the customer's job is not accepted. In our model, we also allow customers to request preferred due dates. For customer j, her preferred due date is denoted as d j . v j (d j ) is the valuation that customer j assigns to a schedule in which their job is completed before d j . Completion of a job after its preferred due date is allowed. However, delayed jobs incur extra costs for the customer. For a schedule S, if customer j has her job completed at c j , her valuation of S is defined as
, where c j is the completion time of job j in S; u j (c j ) is a nondecreasing function that gives the cost incurred for a delayed c j within the acceptable delay window
For the time window r j < c j ≤ d j in which the job is not delayed, u j (c j ) = 0. The DDM involves the selection of a set of job orders N * ⊆ N such that the scheduling constraints for all selected jobs are satisfied and, at the same time, the sum of customer values is maximized. Let S j,k be the starting time of the operation k of the job j, and let Z j = 1 if job j is selected and
subject to
Z j ∈ {0, 1} (10)
where (5)], and k = 1, . . . , n j . The set of constraints (3) and (4) ensures that the operations of a job do not start before its release time and finish after its deadline. The set of constraints (5) ensures that an operation does not start before the previous operation of the same job is completed. The set of constraints (6) is a set of logical constraints which states the following: If two jobs j and j are selected in the schedule, operations o j,k and o j ,k are to be processed on the same resource (q j,k,j ,k = 1), and
These constraints ensure that, at most, one operation can be processed by a particular resource at a time, where H is a large positive constant, which is used for the linearization of the logical constraint "if." Explanations on how this "large positive constant technique" is used in scheduling problem formulation can be found in [11] . The minimum value of H depends on the problem instance. In general, H = max(d j ) + max(t j,k ), where j = 1, . . . , n and k = 1, . . . , n j , is large enough to enforce the logical "if" constraint. Constraints (7) and (8) ensure that the values assigned to the two related variables Y j,k,j ,k and Y j ,k ,j,k are consistent, i.e., if S j,k and S j ,k are to be processed on the same resource, then
Constraints (9)- (11) are nonnegative and integer constraints.
Having modeled the integrated DDM in a job shop environment, we gained insights on the complexity of the problem in terms of the number of constraints and variables. We also know that CDM is a nonlinear model as the objective function of CDM is nonlinear. Now, we turn our attention to the game theoretical modeling of the problem by considering customer valuations as private information not known to the firm. As the computational complexities inherited from the combinatorial nature of the scheduling problem are not related to the game theoretical modeling, we ignore the scheduling details and focus only on strategic interactions. We first model the integrated DDM as a game. We then construct a Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) auction that solves the game with an economically efficient outcome.
B. Game Theoretic Modeling and an Auction Construction
In the centralized formulation, we have assumed that customers' valuations are known to the firm. In the game theoretic modeling, we remove this assumption and consider customers' valuations as private information and that customers will behave strategically to maximize their own benefits. To reflect this self-interest property of the customers, we call them agents. 4 Let N denote a set of n job agents. Each represents a job order from a customer. Job orders need to be scheduled in the firm. Let Γ be the set of all feasible schedules. 5 An agent j needs to pay the firm p j (S) in exchange for producing its job order as scheduled in S. The agents must collectively choose a schedule S ∈ Γ and a vector of payments
Our goal is to design a mechanism which enables the collective selection of schedules. As we have assumed that the firm maximizes market efficiency, the chosen schedules need to maximize the sum of agent valuations. According to Vickrey's private value model, an agent's payoff is linear in the agent's valuation of the schedule and the price paid for the schedule, i.e., v j (S) − p j (S). Agents maximize their payoffs. Therefore, an agent is willing to pay up to its valuation v j (S) to obtain the schedule S. In the following, we construct a VCG auction for the DDM problem. Let V (N ) = max S∈Γ j∈N v j (S) and V (N \ j) = max S∈Γ j∈N \j v j (S). The auction proceeds as follows. Each agent submits its valuations on each element of the set of all feasible schedules Γ. The auctioneer chooses S * from Γ as the final schedule such that S * maximizes
In addition, the auctioneer also computes a schedule for each j ∈ N such that the schedule solves V (N \ j). After the schedules are computed, agent j pays
and agent j's payoff from participating is
is nonnegative, which means that agents always get nonnegative payoffs when participating in the auction. In addition to providing agents with the incentive to participate, the auction is also strategic proof, which means that submitting truth valuations to the auctioneer is a dominant strategy. Suppose that agent j reports w j = v j instead. The auctioneer then chooses a S ∈ Γ that solves
It is clear that no agent can benefit from misreporting its valuation function.
Given that the CDM can be used to obtain Γ and we have constructed the VCG auction that finds the optimal schedule in 4 In this paper, agents also refer to the trading software entities that represent the customer. From this point forward, when we mention customers in the context of system modeling and design, we will use the term "agent."
5 Γ can be obtained by solving constraints of CDM as a constraint satisfaction problem. Note that, unlike in classical scheduling theory, a feasible schedule for a DDM problem does not have to include all job orders. If a job order is not included in a schedule, the customer's valuation on the schedule is zero.
Γ, it seems that we have everything needed to solve the DDM game. However, despite VCG's theoretical elegance, the reality is that its limitations, in terms of implementation, restrict its application to DDM problems. From the auctioneer's side, the implementation of the VCG auction requires the solution of a V (N ) and a V (N \ j) for all j ∈ N , i.e., n + 1 NP-hard optimization problems. The computation cost can be prohibitively expensive if the auction is applied to nontrivial-size problems. In our case, the underlying scheduling model CDM is nonlinear, which usually demands more computation than a linear one. From the agents' side, the VCG auction requires an exponential number of schedules in Γ to be valued by each agent, which presents hard valuation problems to agents. In addition to computation, communicating the large number of schedules to agents can also be a huge burden to the system. Most importantly, VCG requires a complete valuation on alternative schedules to be revealed to the auctioneer. In DDM, customers are often reluctant to do so in case information might leak out and adversely affect other decisions or negotiations. Lack of transparency is another practical concern in VCG auctions. It can be difficult to explain to the customers why a certain schedule is chosen. In the following section, we propose an iterative bidding framework aimed at addressing some of the limitations arising in the application of VCG to DDM.
III. ITERATIVE BIDDING FRAMEWORK
The iterative bidding framework proposed in this paper is an auction-based approach to the integrated DDM problem. The framework contains three major components: a requirementbased bidding language, a linear integer programming model for winner determination, and an iterative bidding procedure. The requirement-based bidding language allows an agent's bid to be expressed by the requirement of processing a job, which naturally represents scheduling constraints and objectives. The winner determination model takes bids, expressed in the requirement-based language as input, and computes feasible schedules which maximize the auctioneer's revenue. The iterative bidding procedure provides a structure for the agents and the auctioneer to interact in a systematic way and eventually evolve the provisional solutions toward an optimal or near optimal one. Iterative bidding also reduces agents' information revelation and adds the potential of accommodating dynamic changes during the bidding process. The iterative bidding framework is a multiattribute auction, which allows negotiation over price and a nonprice attribute: the due date of an agent's schedule. In addition, the framework has good privacypreserving properties. For example, unlike VCG auctions, it does not require the agents' knowledge about the resources, such as their capabilities, availabilities, and configurations. Also, it does not require the complete revelation of agents' valuations.
A. Requirement-Based Bidding Languages
In integrated DDM, customers derive values based on how their jobs are scheduled according to their objectives. From a scheduling perspective, the quality of a schedule can be measured by time-related parameters, e.g., completion times and tardiness. During the due-date negotiation with a firm, a customer can often express her preferences using a conditional statement. For example, a customer may say that she is willing to pay a specific price if the job is completed within a time window, e.g., r j < c j ≤ d j . There are three components in this conditional statement: the job, the time window, and the price. In this section, we propose a requirement-based language for the representation of customers' preferences in terms of these three elements. We first define the atomic bid (C-Bid) of this language.
C-Bid: A C-Bid is a 4-tuple R, ef t, lf t, p where R is the requirement of processing a job consisting of a set of operations to be performed, the precedence constraints, and resource requirements. p is the price that the agent is willing to pay for R to be completed within the time window ef t < c ≤ lf t, where c denotes the completion time of R, ef t stands for the earliest finishing time, and lf t stands for the latest finishing time, which is the due date required by the customer. C-Bids can be connected by an XOR connective as an XOR-C-Bid to represent the values that a customer has on different time windows. For
indicates that customer j is willing to pay p 1 if R j is completed with ef t j,1 < c j ≤ lf t j,1 and p 2 if R j is completed with ef t j,2 < c j ≤ lf t j,2 . Implicitly, here, the customer only wants R j to be processed once, and there is no overlap between the two time windows. If we restrict the value of c to integers, the requirement-based language has full expressiveness in terms of representing customers' valuations using an XOR-C-Bid with a finite number of C-Bids.
Proposition 1: If the value of c j is restricted to integers for a customer j ∈ N , any valuation of customer j in integrated DDM can be represented by an XOR-C-Bid with finite C-Bids.
Proof: See the Appendix. In Proposition 1, we have proved that, if c j is restricted to integers, a customer j can express her full preferences by assigning a value to each possible c j with r j < c j ≤ d j . This restriction is reasonable as customers usually define their due dates in terms of the number of certain time units such as hours or days from the time when a job is released. In addition, by restricting the values of the completion times of all jobs to integers, we will have a finite set of lf t's, which provides us with the possibility of formulating a linear winner determination model as shown in the next section.
B. Linear Winner Determination Model
Given the set of XOR-C-Bids from customers, the task of winner determination is to select a subset of the bids such that all scheduling constraints are satisfied and, at the same time, the sum of customers' values is maximized. A C-Bid can represent a customer's value over a time window defined by the ef t and lf t. This is natural because, very often, a customer could be indifferent to completion times within a certain time interval (a block of adjacent time units). Suppose that a customer has m j indifferent time intervals within the acceptable delayed window
Accordingly, an XOR-C-Bid with m j C-Bids can be constructed to represent the customer's valuations within the window. With the nondelayed r j < c j ≤ d j interval included, the full valuation of a customer can be represented by
We assume that the m j + 1 time intervals are adjacent, i.e., lf t j,i−1 = ef t j,i for 1 ≤ i ≤ m j . Given that ef t j,0 can be obtained from R j , it is sufficient to represent the customer's valuations through a simplified version of the XOR-C-Bid, XOR 0≤i≤m j R j , lft j,i , p i . However, the simplified version does not use ef t: It contains all the information needed to uniquely construct a corresponding full version of the XOR-C-Bid.
In fact, in most due-date quotation scenarios, customers usually use the format of the simplified XOR-C-Bid to express their preferences. For example, they might say "if you promise to complete the job by Thursday, I will pay you $1000; however, if the completion time is Friday, I can only pay you $900." In many cases, an XOR-C-Bid without ef t can be a natural format for expressing customers' preferences. In the following, we formulate a winner determination model, denoted as Linear winner Determination Model (LDM), which takes the simplified version of XOR-C-Bids from customers as input. By doing this, we make the format of the inputs more intuitive for customers. Note that, as stated in Proposition 1, an XOR-C-Bid has the capability to represent a customer's full valuation. However, this does not mean a customer will reveal her valuation in the XOR-C-Bid submitted to the firm. Iterative bidding is essentially a price system, not a direct revelation mechanism. The bidding prices do not necessarily correspond to a customer's valuations. In LDM, we denote the bidding price from customer j on lf t j,i as p j (lf t j,i ). We also need to define several variables. Let Z j,i = 1 if job j is completed before lf t j,i and Z j,i = 0 if otherwise, and let S j,k be the starting time of the operation k of the job j; also, let
and o j ,k need to be processed on the same resource; otherwise, q j,k,j ,k = 0. The winner determination model LDM can be formulated as follows:
where (14)], i = 0, . . . , m j , and k = 1, . . . , n j . Unlike that of CDM, the objective function of LDM is linear. Constraints (16) ensure that only one C-Bid of an XOR-C-Bid is selected in the schedule. Constraints (17)- (25) are essentially constraints (3)- (11) from CDM, except that variable Z now has a two-dimension index. For the sake of completeness and readability, we reproduce the constraints here. LDM takes simplified XOR-C-Bids as input. Constraints (18) show that LDM only requires a job to be finished before the lf t. Job completion after the ef t is not required. Adding constraints (17) , the actual semantic meaning of a
as it considers ef t). Would this "misinterpretation" make any difference in winner determination? The answer depends on whether the agents submit their full valuation in XOR-C-Bids. If agents submit their full valuation (this happens in a direct revelation mechanism), as stated in Proposition 2, interpreting R j , lft j,i , p i as R j , r j , lft j,i , p i does not lead to different optimal solutions. Before presenting Proposition 2, it is useful to go through a small example which demonstrates the basic idea of the proposition.
Example: Suppose that agent j's full valuation can be described by a simplified XOR-C-Bid R j , day 5, $200 XOR R j , day 7, $150 and, from R j , we know that r j = day 0. In LDM, the XOR-C-Bid is interpreted as R j , day 0, day 5, $200 XOR R j , day 0, day 7, $150 . Since R j , day 0, day 7, $150 is equal to R j , day 0, day 5, $150 XOR R j , day 5, day 7, $150 , agent j's full valuation can be written as R j , day 0, day 5, $200 XOR R j , day 0, day 5, $150 XOR R j , day 5, day 7, $150 . Note that, in these three C-Bids, the first and the second one have identical R j , ef t, and lf t, i.e., they can be processed by the same production resources. Whenever a schedule can accommodate the second C-Bid, it must be able to accommodate the first one. Because the two C-Bids are connected by XOR, only one of them can be included in a schedule. Given that the two C-Bids require the same production resources and the price of the first C-Bid is 200 greater than that of the second one, the second C-Bid will never be selected in a final schedule because LDM maximizes the sum of prices. Therefore, removing the second C-Bid from the valuation does not change the optimal solutions. Customer j's valuation now can be represented by R j , day 0, day 5, $200 XOR R j , day 5, day 7, $150 , which is the EFT interpretation of the simplified XOR-C-Bid.
Proposition 2: If customers submit their full valuations in the format of simplified XOR-C-Bids, for the winner determination model LDM, the LDM interpretation and EFT interpretation of the bids do not lead to different optimal solutions.
Proof: See the Appendix. As described in the next section, LDM is used for winner determination for the iterative bidding procedure. In each round of the bidding, agents do not submit a complete valuation. In fact, partial revelation of customers' valuations is one of the main benefits of iterative bidding. Without complete revelation, neither full version nor simplified version of C-Bids can guarantee optimal solutions.
C. Iterative Bidding
The iterative bidding procedure is depicted as a flow chart in Fig. 2 . Initially, an agent has a job to be processed. Before submitting the first bid, the agent needs to initialize a reserve price for the job to be completed between its preferred due date and any other delayed due dates, i.e., lf t's. The reserve price reflects the basic cost of processing a job. Usually, a firm will not go below it for a loss. If an agent has no estimation about the reserve price, it can set the initial reserve prices as zero. However, appropriate setting-up of initial bidding prices can speed up the overall bidding process and, at the same time, maintain the solution quality. In our iterative bidding framework, agents have the incentive to obtain the right reserve prices. It is irrational to submit bids below the reserve prices because those bids will be rejected by the auctioneer. An alternative way is to acquire reserve prices from the auctioneer before the bidding starts. After setting up the reserve prices, agents use them as the first round bidding prices. Unlike regular English auctions, in our iterative bidding framework, price updates are done by agents. Agents use different prices to indicate their willingness to obtain a particular combination of resources through bidding. Therefore, price update and bidding are combined into one step.
1) Price Update and Bidding:
At the beginning of round t (t > 1), agents need to update their bidding prices for each of their due dates. This is based on the provisional schedule which resulted from the winner determination at round t − 1. If an agent was not included in the provisional schedule at round t − 1, it has three price-updating options at round t.
1) It can increase its bidding prices by ε on due dates that it bid for at round t − 1 or rounds before t − 1, where ε is the minimum increment imposed by the auctioneer. Since agents are assumed to be rational in maximizing their utilities, they, in general, do not bid with an increment more than ε. However, an agent is allowed to bid aggressively with higher bidding prices than the minimum increment. This may happen when an agent believes that the competition is heavy and bidding with minimum increment is just a waste of time and communication cost and will not get her into a provisional schedule.
2) It can also keep the bidding prices unchanged (taking an ε discount). However, if an agent takes this ε discount, the auctioneer will consider that the agent has entered into final bid status and the agent is forbidden from increasing the bidding prices at any of its due dates in future rounds. 3) It can, of course, withdraw from the bidding process.
If an agent is included in the provisional schedule at round t − 1, it can keep its bidding price unchanged at round t. That is, it is allowed to repeat its bid at round −1. However, the bidding procedure does not prevent them from bidding higher.
After updating its bidding prices, an agent needs to compute its set of utility-maximizing C-Bids based on the updated bidding prices and its valuation of indifferent time intervals. In computing such a set, an agent j solves a maximization problem
and obtains the set of C-Bids that equally maximizes its utility, where p t j (lf t j,i ) is the bidding price for lf t j,i at round t. That is, for any two due dates i and i in the utility-maximizing set,
After obtaining the set of utility-maximizing C-Bids, the agent joins them together as an XOR-C-Bid and submits it to the auctioneer. If an agent has entered into final bid status, it is no longer allowed to increase its bidding price. However, the auctioneer can choose to allow the agent to repeat its final bid in future rounds until termination. The purpose for this final bid repeating arrangement is to boost the auctioneer's revenue. During the iterative bidding process, some bids can be temporarily "excluded" from the provisional schedule by a particular combination of scheduling constraints and resource requirements from other bids with higher combined values. After several rounds, that particular combination may have changed to allow the space for previously excluded bids to be included in the schedule. However, without final bid repeating, those bids will not be submitted again if their valuations have been reached during the "excluded" periods. Therefore, they would not be included, even though spaces become available for them in subsequent provisional schedules.
2) Bid Screening and Termination: Once XOR-C-Bids are received from the agents, the auctioneer first screens out invalid bids. Those bids will not be considered in the following winner determination procedure. Invalid bids are defined as having the following: 1) any bidding price for a due date which is below the highest bidding price for that due date received in previous rounds; 2) increased prices from agents who have already declared their final bidding status in previous rounds; and 3) bidding prices which are below the reserve prices.
The auctioneer then checks the termination condition against the valid bids. The auction terminates if there are no price updates for all valid bids in this round. That is, all agents that bid in the last round have repeated their bids. After the auction terminates, the auctioneer implements the final schedule, and the agents pay their bidding prices. If the termination condition is not satisfied, the auctioneer will take the set of valid bids as input and solve the winner determination model.
3) Winner Determination:
The auctioneer needs to compute a new provisional schedule in each round as long as the auction is not terminated. At round t, the new provisional schedule S t solves
where Γ t is the set of all feasible schedules, given the valid bids submitted at round t. By lf t j,i ∈ S t , we mean that the due date lf t j,i of agent j is satisfied in the provisional schedule S t . Since the input for winner determination is a collection of XOR-C-Bids consisting of simplified C-Bids, the LDM model can be used for winner determination. LDM can be solved using standard integer programming optimization packages or dedicated winner determination algorithms. In [12] , we have developed a constraint-based winner determination algorithm which allows only one single C-Bid from an agent. The algorithm was designed for the single attribute (price) negotiation and did not take XOR-C-Bids. For the multiattribute negotiation model LDM, we expand the capability of the algorithm to allow agents to negotiate both prices and due dates. LDM can take an agent's preference over these two attributes in the format of an XOR-C-Bid. However, the constraint is that, at most, only one C-Bid of an XOR-C-Bid can be awarded. To handle this restriction, we have added a checking mechanism to the constraint-based winner determination algorithm to prevent the algorithm from selecting more than one C-Bid from the same XOR-C-Bid for a provisional schedule. The checking mechanism is implemented in the Select-Unassigned-Bid (AV ) method of Algorithm 1 in [12] . When the method selects an unassigned C-Bid, it first checks the current schedule. If there is already a C-Bid from the same XOR-C-Bid, the unassigned C-Bid will be excluded from the selection. For the details of the constraint-based winner determination algorithm, readers are referred to [12] .
D. Example
This section presents a worked example of the iterative bidding procedure. As shown in Fig. 3 , Agent1's valuation can be expressed by the XOR-C-Bid: R 1 , 8, 10, $5 XOR R 1 , 10, 11, $2 , where R 1 is the job requirement of Agent1; Agent2's valuation can be expressed by the XOR-C-Bid: R 2 , 8, 9, $6 XOR R 2 , 9, 11, $2 , where R 2 is the job requirement of Agent2. Assume that the resource has the reserve price of $1 an hour and the price increment ε = $2. The bidding prices and allocation of each round of the iterative bidding are shown in Table I . The iterative bidding proceeds as follows.
1) Round #1: The agents use the reserve prices for their jobs as the bidding prices. Agent1 uses a simplified XOR-CBid and bids on the due date 10:00, R 1 , 10, $2 , which requires the time interval (8, 10] , and Agent2 bids on the due date 9:00, R 2 , 9, $1 , which requires the time interval (8, 9] , because, given the current bidding prices, these two due dates maximize agents' utilities. The auctioneer includes only Agent1 into the provisional schedule because the two bids cannot coexist in a schedule and Agent1's bid maximizes the auctioneer's revenue. 2) Round #2: While Agent1 repeats its bid at Round #1, R 1 , 10, $2 , Agent2 increases its bidding price on (8, 9] to $3, R 2 , 9, $3 . After price update, (8, 10 ] from Agent1 and (8, 9 ] from Agent2 become utility-maximizing bids. The auctioneer selects only (8, 9 ] from Agent2. 3) Round #3: Agent2 repeats its bid because it was included in the provisional schedule in Round #2. Agent1 increases its bidding price on (8, 10 ] to $4. After bidding price update, both (8, 10] and (10, 11] become utility-maximizing bids from Agent1, so Agent1 sends R 1 , 10, $4 XOR R 1 , 11, $1 to the auctioneer. Given the bids submitted by Agent1 and Agent2, it is easy to see that there are two solution schedules with the same revenue of $4 for the auctioneer, (8, 10] , Agent1 or (8, 9], Agent2 + (10, 11], Agent1 . According to the winner determination rule, if there are more than one solutions with identical revenue, winner determination prefers the one that includes more agents. Therefore, (8, 9] , Agent2 + 10, 11, Agent1 is selected. 4) Round #4: Both Agent1 and Agent2 repeat their bids. The iterative bidding terminates with an optimal schedule.
IV. PROPERTIES OF THE ITERATIVE BIDDING FRAMEWORK
Compared to one-shot auctions, such as the VCG, iterative bidding promises reduced computation on the auctioneer side and partial revelation of the private information on the agents' side. Also, higher system transparency makes its adoption easier. However, in general, these benefits are obtained with a cost of efficiency. This section evaluates the proposed iterative bidding framework in terms of the tradeoffs among four properties: efficiency, computation, revenue, and information revelation. The evaluation is conducted in the context of integrated DDM. We first develop efficiency and revenue analysis on the application of the iterative bidding framework to two special cases of DDM. We then evaluate the performance of the framework by comparing it with the VCG auction through a computational study.
A. Theoretical Results of Two Special Cases
We have proposed an iterative bidding framework for integrated DDM. It provides a platform for customers and a firm to concurrently negotiate on both prices and due dates. However, in some cases, negotiation along multiple attributes is not always needed. For example, a customer might have a firm single due date (deadline). She would not consider placing an order if the single due date is not satisfied. In addition, she is indifferent to the actual completion times as long as they are before the single due date. We refer to this type of valuation function as single-due-date valuation. If all customers' preferences are single-due-date valuation, negotiation is conducted only along the price dimension because the single due dates are not negotiable. On the other hand, prices in certain industries are largely dictated by the market or industrial standards (i.e., the case of vehicle maintenance and repair industry). In these industries, the manufacture or service provider may not have much flexibility in setting the prices. Therefore, negotiation is mainly along the due-date dimension. We refer to this type of scenario as a fixed-price scenario. We first evaluate the efficiency of applying iterative bidding to DDM with singledue-date-valuation customers.
Proposition 3: In integrated DDM problems, if all customers' preferences are single-due-date valuation and their values on the single due date are congruent to the reserve prices modulo ε, the iterative bidding procedure with final bid repeating always maximizes the sum of customers' valuations at its termination.
Proof: See the Appendix. Proposition 3 states that, in the case of single-due-date valuation, if customers' values are congruent to the reserve prices modulo the minimum increment, the iterative bidding procedure can always maximize the social welfare of customers without revealing complete valuation information. The purpose of the hypothesis that agents' valuations are congruent to the reserve prices modulo ε is to make sure that an agent can bid exactly at its valuation when necessary, given the minimum increment requirement. If we relax the minimum increment requirement at least once during the bidding, then an agent approaching its valuation can always adjust the bidding increment as needed and hit the valuation exactly. In this case, the hypothesis is not necessary.
Let us now turn our attention to the fixed-price scenario where the price of processing a particular type of job is dictated by a commonly known market price or industrial standard. Agents have different valuations on different lf t's. However, unlike the multiattribute case, agents cannot signal the auctioneer regarding their preferences using a price mechanism as prices are fixed and known up front. The only attribute that they can negotiate with the auctioneer and other agents is the lf t. As previously assumed, an agent will strictly prefer a shorter lf t. Therefore, there is no reason for an agent to submit an XOR-C-Bid consisting of multiple C-Bids with different lf t's. An agent will not submit a longer lf t during the iterative bidding unless they are excluded from the provisional schedule. Due to the fixed-price restriction, agents cannot indicate their preferences by setting bidding prices. Without the guidance of bidding prices, the iterative bidding procedure cannot guarantee to converge on a schedule that maximizes agents' social welfare as it does in the single-due-date-valuation case. However, as stated in Proposition 4, the iterative bidding procedure with final bid repeating can achieve Pareto optimality, which means that, at termination, no agent can improve its schedule without hurting at least one agent.
Proposition 4: For the fixed-price cases of integrated DDM, the iterative bidding procedure with final bid repeating terminates with a Pareto optimal schedule.
Proof: See the Appendix. We have established some theoretical results on applying the iterative bidding framework to the two special cases of DDM.
For general DDM problems, we evaluate the performance of our framework through a computational study. We start with defining the evaluation metrics.
B. Experimental Evaluation Metrics
As mentioned at the beginning of this section, we evaluate the iterative bidding framework in terms of efficiency, computation (running time), revenue, and information revelation. These metrics were developed in [13] for testing the performance of iBundle, an iterative combinatorial auction (CA) for general CA problems. We redefine them in the context of integrated DDM.
1) Efficiency of scheduling, ef f (S), is measured as the ratio of the value of the final schedule S to the value of the optimal schedule that maximizes the total value across the agents
where S * is the optimal schedule, given the customers' valuations.
2) Running time of auction refers to the computation time needed to terminate the auction on a DDM problem instance. 3) Revenue of auction, rev(S), is measured as the ratio of the auctioneer's income to the value of the optimal solution
where p j (lf t j,i ) is the maximum bid from customer j for the due date lf t j,i during the auction. 4) Information revelation for customer j, inf (j), is measured as the sum of the final price bid by the customer for all due dates in its valuation function, as a fraction of the sum of the true values of each due date
The overall auction information revelation is computed as the average information revelation over all agents. The auction often terminates before agents have revealed complete information about their values for due dates.
The information revelation metric is designed to measure the extent to which an agent has revealed its value for each due date to the auctioneer during the auction.
C. Problem Sets
We construct our DDM testing problem sets using a twostep procedure. We first generate single-due-date-valuation problems, based on a suite of job shop constraint satisfaction benchmark problems developed in [14] . Two parameters were adjusted to cover different scheduling conditions. The first one is a range parameter RG which controls the distribution of job due dates and release times. The second is a bottleneck parameter BK which controls the number of major bottleneck resources. Due dates are randomly drawn from a uniform distribution M * U (1 − RG, 1) , where U (a, b) represents a uniform probability distribution between a and b and M is an estimate of the minimum makespan of the problem, which is determined by the average duration of all operations and the average duration of the operations requiring bottleneck resources. This estimate was first suggested in [15] . Similarly, release times are randomly drawn from a uniform distribution in the form of M * U (0, RG). The price of bid j is randomly drawn from a uniform distribution on U (du j , du + du j ), where du is the average duration of all bids and du j is the duration of bid j. By considering different combinations of RG, BK, and problem sizes (number of operations and number of bids), problems of various configurations can be randomly generated. For testing the iterative bidding framework, we have generated 15 groups of single-due-date-valuation problems (detailed configurations are summarized in Table II) .
The next step is to generate multiple-due-date problem sets by adding two more due-date valuations to the problem instances of the single-due-date-valuation problem sets. The first due date added represents a 20% delay, and correspondingly, the agent's value on the delayed due date decreases by 20%. The second due date added represents a 40% delay, and the agent's value decreases by 40%. For example, if the single-due-date valuation of an agent's valuation can be represented as a C-Bid R, 10, $10 , the multiple-due-date valuation of the agent can be represented as an XOR-C-Bid R, 10, $10 XOR R, 12, $8 XOR R, 14, $6 . As shown in Table II , we generated nine multiple-due-date-valuation problem sets (Groups 7-15), all with five operations.
D. Comparison Results
We compare the iterative bidding framework with the VCG in which agents report their complete valuations over different due dates at the beginning of the auction and the auctioneer computes the optimal schedule to maximize the summation of agent values. We have coded LDM into ILOG Optimization Programming Languages (http://www-01.ibm.com/software/websphere/products/optimization/) and solved the single-due-date-valuation problems (Groups 1-6) using ILOG CPLEX. The reason for using ILOG for the computation is to validate the correctness of LDM and test the performance of ILOG CPLEX on the model. For the multipledue-date-valuation problem sets, we have applied the modified version of our previously developed constraint-based winner determination algorithm [12] because CPLEX is relatively slow on these multiple-due-date-valuation problem sets.
We tested the efficiency and the revenue performance of the iterative bidding framework on both single-due-date-valuation problem sets and multiple-due-date-valuation problem sets. For single-due-date-valuation problems, we tested two priceupdating options, final bid repeating and nonfinal bid repeating. The optimality result for the single-due-date valuation with final bid repeating stated in Proposition 3 is validated by the experiments. As we see from the experiment data, when ε = 1, which makes every valuation congruent to every reserve price, the iterative bidding procedure always finds optimal solutions. Fig. 4 shows the efficiency and revenue performance of the iterative bidding framework over the six groups of single-duedate-valuation problem sets. In general, it is demonstrated in all six problem sets that bidding with final bid repeating has higher efficiency and revenue than bidding without it. However, the cost is increased computation time. As shown in Fig. 5 , for the single-due-date-valuation problems, bidding with final bid repeating significantly increases the computation time, particularly when the minimum increment is small. Fig. 5 also shows that that computation times for both single-and multiple-duedate-valuation problems are reduced by increasing the minimum increment.
When bidding without final bid repeating, it is interesting to see that, for the problem sets with small numbers of bids, such as Group 1, the efficiency can sometimes increase by increasing the minimum increment. This is due to the "temporary exclusion" that we mentioned previously. With small increments, there will be a larger number of rounds before termination, which increases the possibility for a bid to be "excluded." For a problem with a small number of agents, if one is "mistakenly excluded," the efficiency cost could be high in terms of the percentage of values across a small number of agents. As shown in Fig. 6 , a larger number of agents help mitigate the problem to some extent as we see that the efficiency increases with a larger number of bids under nonfinal bid repeating. To completely avoid this "temporary exclusion" problem, we have designed the final bid repeating price-updating rule. From Fig. 4 , it is clear that final bid repeating is very effective in terms of boosting the efficiency. For all six groups, bidding with final bid repeating has close to 100% efficiency for different increment values. The same reasoning applies to revenue as well. For the multi-due-date-valuation problem sets (Groups 7-15), Fig. 7 plots the efficiency of the iterative bidding over the nine problem sets with bid increment ε = 4. On average, compared to VCG (100% efficiency), iterative bidding without final bid repeating can achieve more than a 90% efficiency. Fig. 8 shows the information revelation performance of the iterative bidding procedure. Compared to VCG, which requires 100% information revelation, the auction requires less than 50% at an increment = 2 and 4. A bigger increment value requires slightly more information revelation. This makes sense because bigger increments may pass some low-price equilibrium points which smaller increments may find. Fig. 9 compares the run time between the iterative bidding procedure and VCG over nine multiple-due-date-valuation problem sets. On average, the iterative auction is more than ten times faster than VCG with the cost of losing 6%-10% efficiency as shown in Fig. 7 . V. RELATED WORK DDM involves four types of decisions: 1) pricing; 2) order acceptance; 3) due-date setting; and 4) scheduling. In this paper, we have proposed a framework which allows the integration of these decisions. Compared with existing DDM approaches, the main contribution of this paper is the multilateral negotiation framework implemented by iterative bidding, which allows decentralized DDM decision making between the firm and its customers. In this section, we discuss this contribution in the context of the DDM literature. Since the proposed framework is an application of iterative auctions to DDM, we will also compare the applicability of several economic-based software systems to the DDM problems and position our bidding framework in the literature.
DDM policies proposed in the literature integrate DDM decisions at different levels. To facilitate the comparison of the proposed framework with the literature, we group existing DDM policies into four categories: DS, DSO, DSOP, and BB. We first describe and summarize these categories and then provide exemplary references in Table III. DS policies only consider due-date setting and scheduling decisions. They ignore the impact of quoted due dates on customers' decisions to place the orders and usually assume that customers are indifferent to when an order is completed (i.e., due date indifferent) as long as it is before the specified deadline. DSO policies add order acceptance decisions to the DS by modeling the probability of a customer placing an order as a decreasing function of the quoted due date. DSOP policies extend the DSO by modeling the probability of a customer placing an order as a function of both quoted price and quoted due date. Negotiation between the firm and its customers is an important aspect of the due-date quotation strategy. BB policies incorporate a bargaining process into bilateral due-date decision making. In the model, both the customer and the firm have a reservation tradeoff curve between the price and the due date, which is private information. BB provides a negotiation mechanism between the firm and its customers. However, it is a bilateral bargaining model, which is not directly applicable to offline situations, where the firm needs to optimize DDM decisions across a group of customers concurrently. In the case of a large number of customers involved in the negotiation, a multilateral model is required.
Compared with existing work in the DDM literature, the proposed framework integrates all DDM decisions, and it also supports decentralized decision making through a multilateral negotiation mechanism. Specifically, the framework extends DSOP by providing decentralized decision making through a multilateral negotiation mechanism. It is also more applicable than the BB in the DDM situations, where the firm needs to deal with multiple customers concurrently because it supports multilateral concurrent negotiation.
In this paper, we have modeled the customers as agents who compete with each other for the firm's production resources to schedule their own jobs according to their respective objectives; the integrated DDM can be seen as a subclass of scheduling problems in decentralized settings. This type of problem is known as a decentralized scheduling problem [31] . In decentralized scheduling problems, agents exhibit complementary preferences over discrete goods. As a subclass, DDM problems also exhibit complementary preferences in agents. For example, a customer usually needs a specific combination of time units on different production resources to complete her job. Part of the combination may have no value to the customer because the job cannot be completed without obtaining the combination as a whole. In the rest of this section, we first review economic models that are relevant to DDM; we then analyze their applicability to DDM problems and position our approach in the literature.
Many economic models that have been studied in the literature can be applied to decentralized scheduling and DDM to some extent. While giving a comprehensive review of these models is beyond the scope of this paper, we summarize four models, which are of importance to DDM, in Table IV . In economics, the concept of a set of interrelated goods in balance is called general equilibrium. General equilibrium theory provides a distributed method for efficiently allocating goods and resources among agents based on market prices. In applying this general-equilibrium-based mechanism to DDM problems, the goods in the markets need to be specified by imposing a discretization on the continuous timeline to be scheduled on the firm's production resources. These goods are discrete ones, which violate the infinite divisibility of goods condition of general equilibrium theory. Markets with discrete goods and complementary preferences of agents can lack equilibria [33] . The performance of general-equilibrium-based market mechanisms on DDM problems is not guaranteed. Sequential and simultaneous auctions price bundles as the sum price of the individual items. However, they do not allow bidders to bid on bundles of items. Sequential auctions suppose that the set of items is auctioned in sequence. Bidders bid for items in a specific known order and can choose how much (and whether) to bid for an item depending on past successes, failures, prices, and so on. Sequential auctions are particularly useful in situations where setting up combinatorial or simultaneous auctions is infeasible. Simultaneous auctions sell multiple items in separate markets simultaneously. Bidders have to interact with simultaneous but distinct markets in order to obtain a combination of items sufficient to accomplish their task. Real-world markets quite typically operate separately and concurrently despite significant interactions in preferences. A typical example is the series of Federal Communications Commission spectrum auctions [37] . In [44] , simultaneous auctions are designed for decentralized train scheduling problems. A review of the uses of economic theory in simultaneous auction design can be found in [47] . Sequential and simultaneous auctions tackle the complementarities over resources in the same spirit of general equilibrium theory. These auctions fail when there are no prices that support an efficient solution (the existence problem) and also when agents bid cautiously to avoid purchasing an incomplete bundle (the exposure problem). However, given that these auctions are more practical in terms of computation, they are two important models worthy of further study.
CAs allow bidders to place bids on bundles of items. It addresses complementary preference issue explicitly. However, the computation required to solve hard valuation problems and winner determination problems can be prohibitive. In general, CAs are likely to be practical for smaller size problems. The computational complexities of CAs have been studied by various researchers [43] . Some sophisticated algorithms have produced promising results [42] . In terms of applying CAs to DDM, if general bundle languages, such as LG or LB [48] , are used, the timeline of the firm's production resources needs to be discretized into small time units. This timeline discretization usually results in a large amount of items to be sold in the auction, which leads to bigger size problems. Applying CAs to a big size DDM can inflict heavy computation burdens on both the customer and the firm side. Another limitation with VCG is the so called "lying auctioneer" problem [49] , which partially explains why the Vickrey auction is not widely used in practice, even though it has been proposed since 1960s.
Iterative bundle auctions are iterative implementations of CAs. This class of auction has practical significance because it addresses the computational and informational complexities of CAs by allowing bidders to reveal their preference information only as necessary as the auction proceeds, and bidders are not required to submit (and compute) complete and exact information about their private valuations. With the careful design of the structure and components, iterative bundle auctions have the potential of significantly reducing computational costs in CAs. In addition, iterative auctions especially designed for scheduling problems have also been proposed in the literature. In [46] , iterative auctions are applied to the job shop scheduling problem. The focus in [46] is to investigate the links between CAs and Lagrangian relaxation and to design auctions based on the Lagrangian-based decomposition. In [31] , the properties of several iterative auction protocols are investigated in the context of decentralized scheduling. In [38] and [50] , price prediction and bidding strategies for simultaneous auctions are studied in the setting of market-based scheduling. The proposed framework in this paper is an iterative bundle auction especially designed for DDM problems. In many cases, iterative auctions present better computational and privacy properties than those of CAs. In addition, iterative auctions have the potential of accommodating dynamic events, which is a common requirement in real-world DDM applications. Compared with existing iterative bundle auctions, the novelty of our design is that it uses a requirement-based bidding language to represent DDM domain-specific due date, pricing, and job requirements. Unlike general iterative auctions which use bundle languages, the requirement-based language avoids imposing timeline discretization, which causes a large amount of items to be sold in the auction; the adoption of this language also enables the design of more efficient winner determination algorithms which take advantage of the domain-specific information to improve the search efficiency. Our previous study [51] has shown that, in auction-based decentralized scheduling, requirement-based languages result in more efficient winner determination models than bundle languages do.
In agent-based manufacturing control literature, the contract net [52] and its later variants have been used in DDM as a class of distributed decision making protocols. Unlike auctions, which usually require a mediator, contract nets are purely distributed models in which any agent can act as a manager and subcontract tasks to other agents. Most of the agent-based control systems were designed for the coordination of production processes within the boundary of an enterprise focusing only on the planning and scheduling part of the DDM. The integration with due-date quotation and order selection decisions is usually not considered. References and reviews of this line of research can be found in [53] and [54] .
VI. CONCLUSION
One of the major challenges facing organizations today is the demand for ever greater levels of responsiveness and shorter defined lead times for deliveries of high-quality goods and services. In order to gain an edge over competitors, firms need to gear their management toward time-based competition, i.e., providing competitive and reliable lead times. However, shorter lead times are not always translated into profits. Given a firm's existing production and supply chain management processes, shorter lead times usually incur higher costs due to expediting. The proposed iterative bidding framework aims at striking the balance between shorter lead times, reliable delivery, and anticipated profits.
The uniqueness of the proposed approach is that it integrates the exploration of customers' due-date flexibility and the support of the firm's DDM decisions within an iterative bidding framework, which has the potential to coordinate the behaviors of self-interested parties in decentralized supply chain environments. For combinatorial (or combinational) auction problems [41] , linear programming formulations have been developed [55] , which enable the construction of incentive-compatible iterative bidding auctions based on the primal-dual design paradigm [44] , [56] . For our DDM problem model, the decentralized procedure proposed in this paper does not approach the pricing equilibrium corresponding to the social opportunity cost. As our iterative bidding procedure does not terminate with VCG payments, it is not incentive compatible under the game theoretic assumption of agent behavior. However, we are designing the system for the type of make-to-order environment in which a firm supplies a large group of customers, such as the case of the Windows and Doors Company Ltd. example. In this context, it is reasonable to take the market (price-taking) assumption, i.e., agents will bid myopically given that each individual agent will have very little impact on the market prices. Despite this game theoretic versus market argument, designing an incentive-compatible iterative bidding auction for integrated DDM problems is a very important research task on our agenda.
APPENDIX A
Proof of Proposition 1
By the definition of customers' value function, we know that, for any c j ≤ r j and 
Proof of Proposition 2
Suppose that the complete valuation of a customer is represented by a simplified XOR-C-Bid, XOR 0≤i≤m j R j , lft j,i , p i . According to the definition, its LDM interpretation is (30) , it can be written as an XOR-C-Bid
where ef t j,0 = r j . We call the C-Bids in (31) sub-bids of a C-Bid in (30) . Each of the sub-bids represents an indifferent time interval of the customer. Note that, for a C-Bid in (30) , for example, the lth C-Bid R j , r j , lft j,l , p l , its last sub-bid is R j , eft j,l , lft j,l , p l , which is actually the EFT interpretation of the corresponding simplified C-Bid R j , lft j,l , p l . We therefore call this last sub-bid an EFT sub-bid. Given that the EFT interpretation is a sub-bid of the corresponding LDM interpretation, if we prove only the EFT sub-bids are effective in the LDM model and other sub-bids will be dominated (as seen in Example 1), we can conclude that LDM and EFT interpretations lead to the same optimal solutions. In the following list, we prove that only the EFT sub-bids are effective using the format of mathematical induction. The last C-Bid in (32) (with k + 1 indifferent time intervals) can be represented by XOR-C-Bid R j , r j , lft j,k , p k+1 XOR R j , eft j,k+1 , lft j,k+1 , p k+1 .
The first sub-bid R j , r j , lft j,k , p k+1 in (33) will be dominated by R j , r j , lft j,k , p k in (32) because p k+1 < p k . Therefore, for the two sub-bids in (33) , only the EFT sub-bid (last one) is effective. Since we have assumed that, for all C-Bids in XOR 0≤i≤k R j , r j , lft j,i , p i , only the EFT subbids are effective, it follows that, for m j = k + 1, for all CBids in XOR 0≤i≤k+1 R j , r j , lft j,i , p i , only the EFT sub-bids are effective. Therefore, the LDM and EFT interpretations of XOR 0≤i≤m j R j , lft j,i , p i lead to the same optimal solutions in LDM.
Proof of Proposition 3
Since customers' preferences are single-due-date valuation, they only need to send simple C-Bids (no XOR-C-Bids) to express their preferences. We assume a private value module for all customers. Under this model, each customer has a value for her schedule. A customer's payoff for a schedule is the difference between her value on the schedule and the bidding price. To maintain positive payoff, the customer is willing to pay up to her value to get her job scheduled. Therefore, if a customer is not included in a provisional schedule, she will keep increasing her bidding prices in future rounds until she is included or she reaches her valuation. Since we have assumed final bid repeating, customers repeat their previous bids at termination (round T ). Therefore, all customers that are not included in the termination schedule (denoted S T ) have bid with their valuations, and the customers that have room to increase their bidding prices at termination are all included in S T . We prove the proposition by showing that S T is identical to the optimal schedule S * computed by solving the winner determination problem using all customers' valuations as inputs.
We construct the customers' bidding prices for an additional round (round T + 1) as follows. Pick a customer l ∈ S T with a bidding price at termination (denoted as p is the single-due-date valuation of l. Since we have assumed that customers' single-due-date valuations are congruent to the reserve prices modulo ε, n must be an integer. For any other customer j ∈ S T and = l, p S T = S T +1 can be a general conclusion for all other customers included in S T . By repeating the aforementioned process for other customers, we can reach a final round where all customers included in S T bid with their valuations. Note that, by definition, the resultant schedule at this final round is S * . Since the resultant schedules do not change during the bidding process after round T , it follows that S T = S * . Therefore, S T maximizes the sum of customers' valuations.
Proof of Proposition 4
Under the fixed-price restriction, if an agent is not included in the final schedule at termination, it must have submitted its deadline. This is because an agent will keep extending its lf t in its C-Bids if it is not included during the bidding procedure until the deadline is reached. Given that agents also repeat their final bids, at termination, the schedule S T is computed based on the deadlines from all agents that are not included and the lf t's from the agents that are included. For excluded agents to improve their individual schedules, they have to be scheduled into S T ; on the other hand, for the agents that are already included, they have to move to positions with shorter lf t's. Since S T is the optimal solution at termination given the inputs from all agents, in both cases, in order to improve an agent's schedule, at least one other agent will be excluded or pushed to a position with a larger lf t. Therefore, S T is a Pareto optimal schedule.
